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INTERNAL CONTROLS
IN THE TALMUD:
THE JERUSALEM TEMPLE
Abstract: We examine the Hebrew Talmud’s account of internal con-
trols in the ancient Jerusalem Temple (c.823 B.C.E. to 70 C.E.) This
far-reaching enterprise involved an extensive system of sacrificial of-
ferings, management of three annual pilgrimages, a court system and
maintenance of a priestly class. We outline the annual process of
collecting half-shekel and other donations, withdrawals from the
Temple treasury and the sale of libations. The Talmud describes nu-
merous internal controls: donations were segregated according to
their specific purposes and donation chests were shaped with small
openings to prevent theft. When making withdrawals from the
Temple treasury, the priest-treasurer was required to wear specific
clothing to prevent misappropriation of assets. The Treasury chamber
itself had seven seals, requiring the presence of seven different indi-
viduals, including the king, in order to open it. The process of selling
libations and meal offerings required purchasing and then redeeming
different tickets, which were specifically marked to prevent fraud. In
explaining the reasoning for this tight system of internal controls, the
Talmud reveals that an individual “shall be guiltless before G-D and
before Israel” [Numbers 32: 22], so that a sound system of internal
controls prevents both theft and any suspicion of theft, thus establish-
ing the fiscal credibility of the Temple institution in the eyes of its
congregants. Such an approach indicates that accounting did not rep-
resent a profane, secular vocation at odds with the Temple’s mission.
To the contrary, a system of accountability formed integral steps in
the Temple’s ritual processes.
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There are three crowns: the crown of learning, the
crown of priesthood, and the crown of kingship, but the
crown of a good name must be upon each of them
[Mishnah Pirkei Avos, 4: 17].
INTRODUCTION
As it discusses the operations of the ancient Jerusalem
Temple (circa 823 B.C.E. to 70 C.E.), the Hebrew Talmud re-
veals a strict set of accountability mechanisms designed to safe-
guard assets. The Talmud describes a far-reaching institution
overseeing an extensive system of offerings, three annual pil-
grimages, a court system and a priestly class. The needs of this
enterprise — supported almost entirely through voluntary dona-
tions — would have been extraordinary. The focus of this paper
is to examine the nature of the internal controls documented in
the Talmud.
Research about the relationship between accounting and
religion can provide new insights into how organizations use
accounting [Birnberg, Turopolec and Young, 1983] and how
societal needs influence organizations’ accounting [Hop-
wood, 1983; Hopwood and Miller, 1994, Puxty 1998]. Recent
accounting research with respect to the Church of England
[Laughlin, 1994], New England Quakers [Fuglister and Bloom,
1991], a 19th century U.S. religious commune [Flesher and
Flesher, 1979], U.S. churches [Duncan, Flesher and Stocks,
1999], the Australian Church [Lightbody, 1999], Islamic reli-
gious organizations [Abdul-Rahman, 2000], the Iona Commu-
nity of Scotland [Jacobs and Walker, 2001], the Salvation Army
[Irvine, 2002], and Ancient Egypt [Ezzamel, 2002; Mattessich,
2002], suggests increased interest in the interface between ac-
counting and religious institutions. The Hebrew Talmud has
much to contribute to this growing body of research. Its descrip-
tion of the operations within the Jerusalem Temple demon-
strates how a strong system of accounting internal controls
could build and maintain the confidence of religious adherents.
Moreover, such a system would have formed an integral part of
ancient religious ritual.
Using techniques of traditional Talmudic scholarship, we
identify many specific internal control processes discussed in
the Jerusalem Talmud tractate named Shekalim. We also refer to
related passages in other sections of the Talmud. These controls
deal with a national system for collecting contributions, safe-
guarding the Temple treasury, and the sale of libations and meal
offerings.
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One would expect the Talmud to simply rebuke those who
would commit theft — “Thou shalt not steal” Exodus, 20: 13;
Deuteronomy, 5: 17]. Presumably, then, pious people com-
manded not to steal would be deemed trustworthy, so that any
controls instituted within the Temple would be unnecessary and
therefore minimal. However, we find the Talmud to be so con-
cerned with preventing any suspicion of financial malfeasance,
that controls are designed to prevent even any appearance of
theft. Furthermore, the Talmud commends individual families
who went to great lengths to avoid any suspicion that Temple-
owned ingredients were misappropriated. The Talmud’s inclu-
sion of these processes suggests that they would have been
widely studied in their time, reinforcing public confidence in the
Temple’s operations. We conclude with an unexpected insight:
controls not only protect stakeholders’ property, but also protect
the integrity and credibility of those entrusted with stakeholders’
property.
THE ORIGINS OF THE TALMUD
The Talmud consists of oral teachings passed down through
generations of ancient scholars. Jewish tradition holds that
many of these teachings were received by Moses at Mount Sinai,
while others were collected through the ages. In the 3rd century
C.E., Rabbi Yehudah haNassi classified these teachings into the
Mishnah, which consists of 63 tractates (“masechtos”) that were
organized into six orders (“sedarim”).1 To respect the custom
that talmudic law should be transmitted orally, from teacher to
student, the Mishnah included only highly concise summaries of
basic principles, all written in Hebrew. To provide more inten-
sive explanations for the Mishnah, later generations of scholars
redacted two different versions of the Talmud:
1 Beginning in the 3rd century C.E., Rabbi Yochanan
and his disciples redacted the Jerusalem Talmud
(“Talmud Yerushalmi”) in Tiberius, near the Sea of
Galilee);2 and
1 The following two complete English translations of the Mishnah, with com-
mentaries, are available: Blackman (1963) and Kehati (1994). Furthermore,
many tractates of a new translation/commentary are now available, published by
Artscroll/Mesorah Publications of Brooklyn.
2 Jerusalem Publications of Brooklyn, NY, has translated certain tractates of
the Jerusalem Talmud to English, including Shekalim, cited in this paper.
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2 In the 6th century, Rabbi Ashi edited the Babylo-
nian Talmud (“Talmud Bavli” in Babylon, in mod-
ern-day Iraq).3
Neither version of the Talmud was completed, each omit-
ting several tractates of the Mishnah. For example, the Jerusa-
lem Talmud, but not the Babylonian Talmud, explains the
Mishnah to the tractate Shekalim (as cited in this paper). In
response to traditions that Talmudic Law should be learned
orally from a teacher, the two versions of the Talmud were writ-
ten in an extremely concise and cryptic form of ancient Ara-
maic-Hebrew. Critical words and phrases were often omitted
and other terminology was intentionally made to seem ambigu-
ous, so that it would be impossible for the prospective student to
simply read a passage of Talmud and understand it without help
from a teacher.
In this article, we outline certain Temple operations and
illustrate notable examples of internal controls over them, as
described in the Talmud and related commentaries.
INTERNAL CONTROL
Internal control is defined as “a process — effected by an
entity’s board of directors, management, and other personnel —
designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achieve-
ment of objectives in the following categories: (a) reliability of
financial reporting, (b) effectiveness and efficiency of opera-
tions, and (c) compliance with laws and regulations.” [Auditing
Standards Board, SAS 55 and 78].4 As such, modern internal
control objectives provide a framework for helping achieve sub-
stantive integrity in meeting these objectives, as well as those
corollary to them, such as protection of the entity’s assets. Mod-
ern organizations employing internal controls benefit not only
from greater assurance that their substantive objectives will be
met, but also from the appearance of credibility afforded them
by the existence of internal controls, conditions necessary for
raising capital from outside investors [Auditing Standards
3 A complete English translation of the Babylonian Talmud is available from
Soncino Press, Brooklyn, NY. Many tractates of two new translation/commen-
taries are available: published by Artscroll/Mesorah Publications, of Brooklyn,
NY, and Random House, NY (Adin Steinsaltz, editor).
4 For purposes of internal control definitions used, we describe Generally
Accepted Auditing Standards, governing the practices of independent certified
public accountants in the United States.
4
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 30 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol30/iss1/5
77Fonfeder, Holtzman, Maccarrone: Internal Controls in the Talmud
Board, SAS 1]. This appearance of credibility appears to have
been of primary concern in the Jerusalem Temple.
Prior accounting research describes numerous cases of ac-
counting functions in the ancient world. Hird [1975] hypoth-
esizes that as individuals in prehistoric societies learned to spe-
cialize, they needed to develop some notion of cost in order to
trade different specialist products. The woodcutter and hunter
could establish how many logs of wood were equivalent in value
to one animal carcass. Therefore, as Swanson [1984] asserts,
accounting may have preceded counting and mathematics. The
development of coins created the need for bookkeepers to main-
tain transaction records.
Stevelnick [1985] offers an analysis of ancient accounting
records found in Egypt and Iraq. Similar records are examined
in greater detail by Garbutt [1984], Mattessich [2002] and
Ezzamel [2002]. Costouros [1978] describes an intricate system
of auditors in ancient Greece. Afosa [1985] documents the ac-
counting records kept by the Ashanti tribes in 16th and 17th
century Ghana. Hagerman [1980] cites scriptural passages
which suggested the need for financial accounting, managerial
accounting and internal controls. Mann [1984] quotes Talmudic
passages regarding income tax policies in ancient Hebrew law.
In this paper, we seek to augment this body of research. We
document the integration of “secular” or “profane” controls into
“sacred” ritual, and we identify the importance attached to repu-
tation effects in an ancient religious institution.
INTERNAL CONTROLS IN THE JERUSALEM TEMPLES
According to traditional Talmudic sources, the Israelites
constructed the Tabernacle as a center for their program of of-
ferings, one year after they had left Egypt (1309 B.C.E.). This
Tabernacle, a tent made of wood, metals, tapestries and hides,
was disassembled, moved, and reassembled numerous times as
the Israelites migrated through the desert to the Holy Land. In
830 B.C.E., to permanently replace the Tabernacle, Solomon
began construction of the First Temple in Jerusalem [Reznick,
1994, p. 195]. According to biblical accounts, its construction
was a tremendous undertaking, requiring the services of 10,000
woodcutters in Lebanon, 80,000 stonecutters, 70,000 porters
moving building materials to the site, and 3,300 supervisors [I
Kings, 5: 29]. By 823 B.C.E., the First Temple was completed
and formed a religious, social and judicial center for the Israel-
ite nation. Authorities forbade offerings to be made in any other
5
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location, and all Israelites were required to make three annual
pilgrimages to the Temple. Furthermore, the Great Sanhedrin, a
national court handling religious and civil matters, met in the
Temple complex.
In 420 B.C.E., armies of the Babylonian Emperor
Nebuchadnezzar destroyed the First Temple. Following the
Babylonian exile, the Second Temple was completed in 346
B.C.E. This was similar to the First, but lacked the Ark of the
Covenant, which could not be located. In 16 B.C.E., Herod en-
larged and rebuilt the Second Temple, which was destroyed by
armies of the Roman General Titus in 70 CE. Figure 1 provides
a floorplan of the Second Temple, as recorded in the Babylonian
FIGURE 1
Floor Plan of the Second Jerusalem Temple5
Holy of Holies
Lishka Tzfon,
where receipts
for offerings
were issued
Probable
location of
collections
chests and
Temple treasury
(according to
Reznick)
Oils Chamber,
where receipts
were redeemed
5 According to Babylonian Talmud Tractate Midos, From Talmud Bavli
(Jerusalem, Israel: Telman). English annotations by the authors.
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Talmud Tractate Midos. Figure 2 offers a photo of a modern
reconstruction of Herod’s Second Temple, as presented at the
World’s Fair in New York, 1939.
The wide-encompassing objectives of the Temple’s opera-
tions necessitated a nationwide fund-raising movement and a
complex system for maintaining and expending Temple assets.
Talmudic sources list many specific internal control processes
over the Temple treasury, including those over collections of
biblically-mandated half-shekel donations, withdrawals from the
Treasury, and distributing offerings, all premised on the idea
that public confidence in the workings of the Temple was sacro-
sanct.
FIGURE 2
Model of the Second Jerusalem Temple6
Holy of Holies Lishka Tzfon,
where receipts
for offerings
were issued
Probable
location of
collections
chests and
Temple treasury
(according to
Reznick)
Oils Chamber,
where receipts
were redeemed
6 by Architect Yakov Yehuda, presented at the 1939 New York World’s Fair.
From “Background on the Daily Daf,” Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof, Israel.
http://www.dafyomi.co.il/meilah/middos04.htm. Annotations at bottom by the
authors.
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Collections of Half-Shekel Donations: The book of Exodus com-
mands every adult male Israelite to contribute exactly one-half
Shekel each year to the Tabernacle [30: 12]. These moneys
would be used to fund communal offerings.7 The Jerusalem Tal-
mud tractate “Shekalim” (literally “shekels”) explains how these
coins were collected, how they were accounted for, and other
aspects of the Temple’s administration. The beginning of the
tractate states that on the first day of the final month of the
year, called Adar, announcements would inform the people that
the annual collection of half-shekel coins was about to com-
mence [p. 2a].8
The Jerusalem Talmud then proceeds to dissect this state-
ment. It first asks why the announcement was made on the first
day of Adar, answering that this announcement would give
people one month to contribute before the moneys would be
expended from the Temple treasury, on the first day of Nissan,
the first month.9 These collections would then fund all public
offerings to be made in the next year, beginning in the month of
Nissan. The Talmud derives that the Temple’s fiscal year begins
on the first day of Nissan by citing a scriptural passage from
Exodus: “And it was in the first month of the second year on the
first of the month, that the Sanctuary was erected” [Exodus, 40:
17].
If the Sanctuary was erected on the first day of the first
month, the Talmud reasons, then this must be the beginning of
the Temple’s fiscal year.
7 Talmudic commentaries differ on the actual weight of a half-shekel coin.
Goldwurm [2000, p. 161] derives that a half-shekel would weigh either the
equivalent of 160 or 192 barley grains, which would translate to 0.256 or 0.215
troy ounces.
8 Unless otherwise indicated, we paraphrase the concise Talmudic passages.
All translations are by the authors. To give the reader a taste of the Talmud’s
style, here is a more literal translation of the above-cited passage: “On the first of
Adar they announce on the shekels” [p. 2a]. In citing Talmudic passages, we use
the name of the Talmud tractate, followed by the page number, as published in
the traditionally-used “Vilna” edition. In situations where the name of the
tractate is already provided the text, we provide only the page number. When
citing Mishnah passages, we provide the chapter and sentence numbers, sepa-
rated by a colon.
9 Today, in traditional Jewish congregations, the Sabbath preceding (or fall-
ing on) the first of the month of Adar is called “Sabbath Shekalim”. On that date,
Exodus 30:11-16 and II Kings 11:17-12:17 are publicly chanted. Two weeks later,
in commemoration of the ancient shekalim collections, congregants donate one-
half unit of the modern-day currency designated for the upkeep of the syna-
gogue.
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The Talmud describes the collection process in detail. On
the 15th of Adar, Temple messengers would arrive in the towns
of ancient Israel, to collect donations and change different types
of currencies. According to Maimonides, the messengers were to
“ask softly” for the half-shekel, but had no authority to coerce
people to pay. On the 25th of Adar, according to the Mishnah,
the messengers sat near the Temple Mount, and were permitted
to seize collateral from people who still had not paid.10 However,
they could not seize collateral from women, slaves, minors un-
der the age of 20, or members of the priestly class. For women,
slaves and minors, the half-shekel donations were optional.
While priests were legally obligated to pay, they were not co-
erced because of the voluntary services they provided to the
Temple [p. 3b].
Procedures were in place in case the half-shekels were lost
or stolen while in the possession of the Temple messengers. The
messenger was required to swear a three-fold oath that (1) he
was not negligent, (2) the objects were not in his possession and
(3) he had not personally used them [p. 5a]. Taking such an oath
would have been a serious matter because its violation would
profane the Third Commandment — “You shall not take the
name of the L-rd your G-D in vain” [Exodus 20: 7 and
Deuteronomy 5: 11].11 Prior to the counting of the Shekels on
the first of Adar (see below), the messenger would take an oath
in the presence of the townspeople, who would then be required
to donate half-shekels for a second time. However, after the first
of Adar, once the half-shekels had been counted, then the lost or
stolen half-shekels were considered to belong to the Temple. The
messenger would take his oath in the presence of the Temple
Treasurer, and the Temple would have to absorb the loss [p. 5a].
10 This raises the question: were half-shekel donations voluntary or manda-
tory? For Israelite males older than 20 years of age, they were mandatory. How-
ever, these half-shekel donations probably represented only a small fraction of
the resources necessary to maintain an extensive system of communal offerings
and to support the priestly classes. Israelites were also required to contribute
t’ruma (tithes) from a percentage of crops grown, first fruits, certain first-born
animals, and other assets to the priestly class. However, the Temple also relied
on private donations in the form of crops, precious metals, coins, land, or other
assets.
11 In Jewish Law, spelling out a Divine name adds sanctity to the document
onto which it is written, requiring that the document not be used or disposed of
disrespectfully. Accordingly, we use the commonly-used convention of abridging
these names with hyphens.
9
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The messenger could choose to shirk from an oath by contribut-
ing the lost currency without any admission of guilt.
If the missing half-shekels were subsequently found or re-
covered, then they were forwarded to the Temple. Any donations
made in their stead were also kept by the Temple and, the
Mishnah explains, their donors were not given any type of
“credit” toward future donations [p. 5a] because funds originally
designated for offerings in one year could not be used for offer-
ings in a subsequent year [Yoma, 13a].
In the Temple Mount, there were 13 chests, described as
“horns” [Shekalim 15b], labeled for different purposes and ar-
ranged in a circle.12 These chests were labeled for:
1 “New” shekels (donations for the current year’s col-
lection of shekels).
2 “Old” shekels (donations owed from previous
years).
3 Nests (to be spent on dove offerings).
4 Young Pigeon burnt offerings.
5 Wood (to be used for fire on the altar).
6 Frankincense (to be used toward the incense).
7 Gold for the utensils.
8 Remainder of sin offering.
9 Remainder of the guilt offering.
10 Remainder of bird offerings.
11 Remainder of nazirites’ offerings.
12 Remainder of lepers’ offerings.
13 “Donative” offerings (general contributions for of-
ferings to be made when the altar was unoccupied)
[Goldwurm, 2000, p. 116].
Chests 8 through 13 were used to collect surpluses earned
by the Temple from the sale of different types of offerings.13
Like modern collection boxes, each chest was angled to be
narrow on top and wide at the bottom, creating physical con-
trols to prevent theft.
The Mishnah prescribes how to handle coins found between
the chests:
12 These chests were most likely in a chamber outside of the Temple itself,
but within the Temple Mount complex [Reznick, 1994, p. 72]. We contacted
Reznick, who felt that the chests and the Temple treasury were located in a
courtyard north of the Temple, within the Temple Mount complex. See Figures 1
and 2.
13 The Mishnah specifically names only chests 1 through 7. Chests 8 through
13 are enumerated in Maimonides’ commentary to the Mishnah.
10
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If coins are found between the new shekels chest and
donative offering chest and they are closer to the new
shekels chests, they should be placed into the new shek-
els chests. If they are closer to the donative offering
chests, they should be placed into the donative offering
chests. If they are equidistant between the two, they
should be placed into the donative offering chests. If
coins are found between the wood chest and the frank-
incense chest . . . The general rule is that we decide
where to place fallen coins based on proximity. How-
ever, in a case of equidistance between two chests, we
decide for stringency [where, in the above order, dona-
tive offerings are most stringent and new shekels are
least stringent] [p. 19a].
Withdrawals from the Temple Treasury: Coins were withdrawn
from the Temple treasury three times a year, two weeks before
each of the three major festivals: Pesach (the early spring festival
Passover), Atzeret (the late spring holiday Pentecost) and Chag
(the autumn festival of Tabernacles) [p. 7b].14 Such withdrawals
were made under very tight controls. According to the Mishnah,
the priest-treasurer withdrew three chests, individually labeled
with the first three letters of the Hebrew alphabet, in sequence.
This priest-treasurer could not wear a hemmed garment, shoes,
sandals, phylacteries traditionally worn on the arm and head, an
amulet, or any other garment that could conceal coins [p. 8a].
As the Talmud explains, these controls protect the reputation of
the priest-treasurer. If he one day became poor, it would not be
suspected that his poverty resulted from divine retribution for
stealing from the treasury. On the other hand, if he became
14 The Talmud does not state where the Treasury was located. Perhaps se-
crecy over its location was maintained as a control over theft. However, it is also
possible that the locations of chambers outside the Temple, but within the
Temple Mount, were insufficiently important to be included in the Talmud.
According to Reznick, the Temple treasury was most likely located in a court-
yard north of the Temple, within the Temple Mount complex [telephone inter-
view]. See Figures 1 and 2. Josephus records that Pompey entered the Holy of
Holies, “which no one was permitted to enter but the high priest, and saw what
it contained . . . sacred money totaling 2,000 talents” [1959, p. 47]. This suggests
that some Treasury monies may have been kept in the Holy of Holies. However,
the Holy of Holies could not have also served as the Treasury Chamber referred
to in the Talmud because the treasurer would have been forbidden to enter it.
Rather, surpluses may have been stored in the Holy of Holies, either on a perma-
nent basis or for safekeeping during the Roman siege.
11
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wealthy, people would not suspect that his wealth came from
the Treasury.
The Talmud goes on to provide scriptural sources for this
principle of avoiding acts that might create suspicion [p. 9a]:
“You shall be clean before G-D and before Israel” [Numbers, 32:
22]. “Find favor and good understanding in the eyes of G-D and
man” [Proverbs, 3: 4].
The first quote includes “Israel,” and the second includes
“man” in order to emphasize that people must not only satisfy
an all-knowing G-D, but also must satisfy “the eyes of man,”
who may suspect the priest-treasurer, or, for that matter, any
person with fiduciary responsibilities, of wrongdoing, even mis-
takenly. On the same folio page, the Jerusalem Talmud again
cites these verses adding a third verse, from Joshua: “L-rd Al-
mighty G-D, He knows, and Israel shall know, if in rebellion, or
if in transgression against the L-rd . . . Let the L-rd himself de-
mand reparation” [Joshua, 22: 22].
The Jerusalem Talmud then recalls that Gamliel Zuga asked
Rabbi Yosi ben Rabbi Bun, which verse is the most relevant of
them all? He answered him, “and you will be guiltless before G-
D and before Israel” [Numbers, 32: 22] [p. 9a]. Rabbi Sirilio,
cited in Rabbi Yaakov Shulman’s translation/commentary, ex-
plains that the quotation from Numbers, “and you will be guilt-
less before G-D and before Israel” best supports this principle
because it refers to financial transactions, while the quotation
from Joshua refers to idolatry, and the verse in Proverbs is a
general admonition [Shulman, 1998, p. 9a(3)].
In reference to the responsibilities of a charity collector, the
Babylonian Talmud cites this same scriptural verse from Num-
bers. If a charity collector collected an excess of funds, but had
no poor recipients to whom to distribute the funds, what should
he do with rust-prone copper coins? He must change them for
silver coins, but may not do so with his own money. Similarly, if
a communal meal for the poor had left-over food, the meal’s
supervisor must sell the excess food to others, and not to him-
self. This is because the scripture states: “And you should be
clean before G-D and before Israel” [Numbers, 32: 22]
[P’sachim, 13a]. One could suspect that the charity collector or
meal supervisor personally profits from communal acts of good-
will. As in the prior examples cited from the Jerusalem Talmud,
the ancient law demands that individuals with fiduciary respon-
sibilities maintain an appearance of propriety.
In what context is the verse “And you should be clean before
G-D and before Israel” written? When the Israelites were wan-
12
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dering in the desert, the Israelite tribes of Reuben and Gad ap-
proached Moses, asking to settle in Gilead, a territory already
conquered east of the Jordan River, instead of the Land of Israel
proper. Moses, however, expressed concern that the tribes
would subsequently avoid fighting alongside their brethren to
conquer the Land. Therefore, he required that the two tribes
settle in Gilead only after they helped conquer the entire Land of
Israel. Only then could they be “clean before G-D and before
man”. In this sense, the verse directs one to behave in a manner
“beyond reproach” by the standards of both G-D and society.
How could Reuben and Gad reassure the Israelite tribes that
they would not abandon their battles to conquer the Land? By
refusing to settle in their territory until the entire Land was
conquered. Similarly, how could the priest-treasurer reassure
the public that Temple assets were not misappropriated? By
observing a strict system of internal controls. The following
proverb in the Mishnah tractate “Pirkei Avos,” refers to a similar
principle: “[Rabbi Chanina ben Dosa] used to say: He who is
pleasing to his fellows is pleasing also to G-D; and he who is
displeasing to his fellows is displeasing also to G-D” [3: 13].
The Jerusalem Talmud notes additional controls over the
priest-treasurer’s withdrawals, explaining that withdrawals
should not be made by a “kovetz,” defined as a curly-haired
person. Before he could perform the withdrawal, his hair would
have to be untangled to make it more difficult to hide coins, a
physical control to safeguard assets. Alternatively, Maimonides,
in his authoritative redaction of the Talmud called the Mishnah
Torah, states that a kovetz is a poor person who, in order to
avoid suspicion of fraud given his arguably greater temptation
to steal, should not perform the withdrawals. Such controversies
are common in Talmudic literature, and reflect the diversity of
knowledge transmitted through many generations of oral teach-
ings.
In order that he could not store coins in his mouth, the
priest-treasurer making the withdrawal was required to talk dur-
ing the whole withdrawal process — another physical control
over assets. Alternatively, the Jerusalem Talmud suggests that
they could have filled his mouth with water. However, this
would have prevented him from reciting a necessary blessing.
Rabbi Yaakov Wehl, in his 20th Century commentary Ikva
Aharon on Shekalim, indicates another possible way of prevent-
ing theft: one or more witnesses might accompany the priest-
treasurer, an independent check on the performance. This he
rejects, however, reasoning that if the witness became poor,
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people might suspect that his poverty was divine retribution for
stealing from the Treasury, or for assisting in the priest-
treasurer’s fraud. Therefore, witnesses were never allowed into
the Treasury chamber [Shulman, 1998, 9a(2)].
In its organizational structure, the Temple emphasized the
sharing of responsibilities and segregation of controls. For ex-
ample, at any given time at least three treasurers and seven
supervisors were appointed over the Treasury. In general, the
Talmud tells us, any fiduciary responsibilities were assigned
jointly to at least two people [p. 14b].
Other Physical Controls over the Treasury: As an example of these
tight controls, the Jerusalem Talmud explains the process for
opening and sealing the treasury chamber. When sealing the
chamber, the treasurer would affix his seal. Then, the trustee,
the controller, the high priest, and the king would each affix
their seals. When opening the chamber, the king, the high priest,
the controller, the trustee and the treasurer would each examine
his seal to make sure that it had not been tampered with, and
then open it [p. 14b].
A Budget: Furthermore, the Talmud provides a budget detailing
how the Temple’s collections should be expended. First, daily
offerings were purchased followed by additional offerings (with
libations), the Omer offering, the two loaves (offered in the Pen-
tecost festival), the twelve loaves (placed in the Holy of Holies
every Sabbath), and all public offerings. Guards hired by the
Temple to watch over its fields of crops were also paid for their
services [p. 9b]. Furthermore, the red heifer (with other supplies
necessary for its preparation) and the scapegoat offered on the
Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur) were paid for. Any remaining
funds were used to pay for a ramp for transporting the red
heifer, a ramp for the scapegoat, supplies necessary for offering
the scapegoat, maintaining canals running under the Temple,
city walls and towers maintenance, and other needs of the City
of Jerusalem [p. 10b]. Any remaining surplus was spent on
wines, oils and fine flours to be resold by the Temple for use in
offerings, at a profit. In the Talmud Rabbi Akiva disagrees, stat-
ing that the Temple did not invest its own money or that of the
poor [p. 11a]. Rather, any remaining moneys were spent on gold
sheets to plate the Ark in the Holy of Holies [p. 12a].
One scholar cited in the Talmud, Abba Shaul, argues that
the High Priest himself, not the Temple, paid for the ramp used
to transport the red heifer [p. 10b]. Abba Shaul’s argument indi-
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cates that there was an awareness of an entity concept — certain
costs fell within the jurisdiction of the Temple, while others did
not. Maintenance of community property in Jerusalem was con-
sidered to be, in part, the responsibility of the Temple. However
other expenditures, including possibly the red heifer’s ramp,
were the responsibility of others.
Controls over Sales of Libations and Meal Offerings: As outlined
in Numbers [15: 2-10], certain Temple ceremonies required
wine libations and meal offerings made of flour and oil. Accord-
ing to the Mishnah and Jerusalem Talmud, a complex system of
internal controls was instituted to sell and distribute items.
Four types of receipts for the purchase of libations or meal
offerings were available, each inscribed with one of the follow-
ing words: “calf,” “male,” “kid” or “sinner”. Each receipt would
entitle its purchaser to the necessary libations or meal offerings
required for different ceremonies.
First, the Mishnah tells us, a person in need of a libation
would pay Yochanan, the receipts administrator, and receive a
receipt. Yochanan (or one of his predecessors or successors)
could be found in the Receipts Chamber (called Mizrach Tzfon
b’Vais haMoked — See Figures 1 and 2). The person in need of
libation would then walk to Achiyah, the libations administra-
tor, submit his receipt, and receive the appropriate libation or
meal offering. Achiyah would have been located in the Oils
Chamber (called Lishkas Bais haShemanim — See Figures 1 and
2). Separation of functional duties of transaction authorization
from execution was thus achieved. At the end of the day,
Yochanan and Achiyah would meet and count the receipts and
coins collected. The Mishnah literally states that the Temple
would have the “upper hand”. If there were more coins than
receipts, the Temple kept the excess. If, however, there was a
shortage of coins, Yochanan would have to pay the deficiency
out of pocket [p. 15a].
Furthermore, there was a procedure in place in case of a
lost receipt. Each evening, the administrators would count the
coins and receipts. If, corresponding to a claim, there was a
difference between the coins and receipts, Achiya would provide
the claimants with a libation or meal offering. If there was no
corresponding difference, the claimant would receive nothing,
thus achieving “protection of assets” in the spirit of goodwill.
The Jerusalem Talmud explains that, in order to prevent
fraud, each receipt was inscribed with the day of the week, the
name of the week, the month, and the name of the priestly
15
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rotation on duty that week.15 The Talmud explains that, because
of the low probability of the weekday, week, month and priestly
rotation, the Temple officers were not concerned that a person
could subsequently use an old receipt to purchase libations or
meal offerings [p. 15a].
PROTECTION OF ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS
As commanded in Leviticus [24: 5-6], 12 loaves of bread
(“the showbreads”), requiring specific expertise in baking, were
placed on the table in the Temple each week. Furthermore, Exo-
dus [30: 34-38] prescribes the burning of a uniquely-mixed in-
cense, which could not be appropriated for non-Temple use. It
was deemed essential that these activities be strictly controlled.
The Mishnah assigns responsibility for baking showbreads
to the Garmu family, and the preparation of the incense to the
Avitnas family. Each family practiced certain stringencies to
make sure that others could not suspect them of misappropriat-
ing Temple-owned ingredients. The Jerusalem Talmud praises
the Garmu family, responsible for the Showbreads, because at
home they would not bake with the type of light-colored flour
used by the Temple, so that people should not say that they ate
from the ingredients owned by the Temple [p. 14a]. In order to
avoid suspicion that they misappropriated the showbread flour,
the Garmu family used a different-colored flour when baking
bread for themselves. In this way suspicions were allayed.
Similarly, the Jerusalem Talmud praises the Avitnas family,
which was responsible for the preparation of the incense. The
women of this family did not wear any type of perfume. Further-
more, when a woman married into this family, she would agree,
in writing, as a condition of marriage, not to wear perfume, so
that people should not say that members of the Avitnas family
perfume themselves with the precious ingredients designated for
the Temple incense [p. 14a].
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH IN
ACCOUNTING AND RELIGION
Initially, we expected the Talmud to deem Temple managers
G-D-fearing and trustworthy, requiring minimal internal control
processes over them. However, we found the Talmud to teach
15 Priests were reservists, divided into 24 watches by family, who would each
serve for one weekly period during each 24 week cycle.
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that a tight system of internal controls will protect the integrity
and reputation of the pious, building the integrity of the institu-
tions for which they are responsible. Similar conflicts between
control and trust can be illustrated by financial management in
the modern Church of Australia, as described by Lightbody
[1999]. Lightbody identifies two strategies of guardian behavior
— “storing” and “shielding” — through which religious leaders
set aside and protect funds for their own pet jurisdictional uses.
Such strategies may explain why controls must exist over trust-
worthy, pious individuals. Goal incongruence may encourage
such individuals to focus on their own provinces, even at a cost
to the institution as a whole. The Talmud alludes to religious
institutions’ problems in allocating scarce resources by provid-
ing a list of spending priorities, and describing the system of
charity collection boxes to be found inside the Temple court-
yard.
Recent studies by Ezzamel [2002] and Irvine [2002] explore
later religious institutions’ role in redistributing wealth. Within
the Talmudic tradition, land holdings were linked with wealth.
After Joshua’s conquest, all tribes received land except for Levi
[Joshua, 13: 14]. As part of the tribe of Levi, the priestly class
did not receive any land holdings. Therefore, many sacrificial
offerings were designated for the priestly class, and required
donations of crops and animals were designated for the Levites.
As such, landholders supported the Levites, the priestly class,
and, in as much as the Levites and priests served the Temple,
landholders also supported the Temple’s operations. However,
the half-shekel donations described earlier were designated spe-
cifically for the Temple’s operations.
To further redistribute wealth, agriculturalists were re-
quired to make portions of their fields available for harvesting
by the poor, a system described in the Talmud tractates Pe’ah
and D’mai and illustrated in the book of Ruth [2: 2]. Further-
more, the jubilee year, declared every 50th year, permitted each
family to regain ownership over the land holdings that it
claimed in the time of Joshua alleviating many wealth imbal-
ances.
In his study about the Church of England during the late
20th century, Laughlin [1988] discusses how religion seeks to
distinguish the sacred from the profane, so that sacred institu-
tions establish themselves as strongholds against the profane.
The Talmud makes similar distinctions. For example, Talmudic
law distinguishes individuals by both birthright and ritual pu-
rity. In order to enter the Temple, individuals must be ritually
17
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pure, being required to avoid contact with leprosy, menses and
the dead for a period of time, and then immersing in a ritual
pool. Furthermore, descendents of the Biblical Aaron and Levi
have special privileges and responsibilities within Temple ritu-
als. Certain crops and livestock were also designated for the
Temple’s operations and were forbidden to be used otherwise.
Even certain ideas, such as those rooted in idolatry, were con-
sidered to be so anathema to the prevalent philosophy that they
would have no role to play in the functioning of the Temple or
the prevailing court system. Accordingly, because ideas of ac-
countability were not explicitly commanded by Scripture, one
might assume that they would be deemed profane or idolatrous,
and unworthy of practice within the Temple’s precincts. To the
contrary, the Talmud’s extended discussion of internal controls
indicates that systems of accountability formed an integral por-
tion of the Temple’s rituals. There was no separation between
secular accounting processes and sacred service, so much so
that actions that might raise suspicion of theft could have been
deemed akin to theft itself. Furthermore, judging from the frag-
mentary nature of the Talmud’s redaction, it is probable that the
tight physical controls described in the Talmud represented only
a small fraction of the controls in place over the Temple’s opera-
tions.
CONCLUSION
In this study we have explored internal controls over the
collection of half-shekel donations, withdrawals from the
Temple treasury, entry to the Treasury, the sale and distribution
of libations and meal offerings, and the protection of ingredients
essential for religious purposes as described in the Jerusalem
Talmud. One would expect the Talmud to admonish its students
against theft, but not to implement minimal controls over a
priestly class deemed pious and trustworthy. To the contrary,
the Talmud describes what appears to have been a tight system
of physical and operational controls. Since the Mishnah and
Jerusalem Talmud are written redactions of teachings passed
down through generations of scholars, and studied during the
times of the Jerusalem Temple, we can presume that these
teachings would have increased peoples’ confidence in the work-
ings of their central religious organization, providing assurance
that donations were expended appropriately.
During our research, we found no mention of record keep-
ing. This does not necessarily indicate that no record keeping
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took place. For example, in The Jewish War, historian Josephus
records specific amounts taken from the Temple treasury:
Pompey and his staff went into the Sanctuary . . . and
saw what it contained . . . sacred money totaling 2,000
talents [p. 47].
For the campaign against the Parthians, Crassus re-
moved all the gold from the Sanctuary in Jerusalem,
including the 2,000 talents Pompey had not touched [p.
51].
As the survivors fled in terror the [Roman] soldiers
swooped on the unguarded treasury of God and carried
off about four hundred talents; what they did not steal
Sabinus collected [p. 125].
However, if Temple records were unavailable to Josephus,
he would have received these counts from the Romans. Further-
more, it is possible that Talmudic material explaining such
record keeping practices may have been lost over the millennia.
However, its apparent omission suggests that record keeping
and reporting was of low priority.16 While the Talmud tells us
how donations should have been spent, it is possible that no
reporting mechanism existed — or was deemed necessary — to
describe how donations were actually spent.
Most surprising, however, in the course of this research, is
our finding that piety may have compelled fiduciaries to accept
stronger, rather than weaker controls over their actions. The
tendency may be to trust the religious person, on the presump-
tion that a G-D-fearing person will not steal. To the contrary, the
Talmud teaches that tight internal controls protect the integrity
and reputation of the pious, and of the institutions for which
they are responsible.
In this study, we have explored one of many links between
Jewish tradition and accountability. Other studies may lead to
interesting insights into the interface between religion and ac-
counting in historical contexts. These include Talmudic systems
of taxation, computation of tithes, explicit accounting records in
the Bible, and philosophies of individual accountability before
the Divine.
16 Financial record keeping was possible given the careful calendar records
mentioned elsewhere in the Talmud.
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